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Abstract
This Essay will examine strategies implemented by national carriers in the European Union (or
‘EU‘) to preserve their longstanding monopolies that were constructed and protected by Member
States against new airlines emerging in the framework of the liberalization of European Commu-
nity (“EC” or “Community”) air transport. This analysis necessitates an assessment of whether
liberalization of air transport in Europe has been a success, and if not, or not completely, what
remains to be done to allow new entrants to challenge flag carriers, which still benefit from the
advantages attributable to former protectionist regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay will examine strategies implemented by national
carriers in the European Union (or "EU") to preserve their long-
standing monopolies that were constructed and protected by
Member States against new airlines emerging in the framework
of the liberalization of European Community ("EC" or "Commu-
nity") air transport. This analysis necessitates an assessment of
whether liberalization of air transport in Europe has been a suc-
cess, and if not, or not completely, what remains to be done to
allow new entrants to challenge flag carriers, which still benefit
from the advantages attributable to former protectionist regula-
tion.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
To understand the current structure of the EC aviation in-
dustry and the origin of the advantages of national carriers that
tend to persist even after liberalization,' one has to recall the
time before liberalization.
A. Era of Bilateralism
For more than four decades, air transport in the Commu-
nity has been dominated by a system of protection where na-
tional air carriers were protected by Member States against na-
tional and foreign competitors.2 Under this system, each Mem-
* Attorney, Oppenhoff & Raedler.
1. See HANSJOCHEN EHMER, EIN WETrBEWERBSLEITBILD FOR DEN LUFTVERKEHR. DLR
8 (1997) (summarizing study commissioned by German Transport Minister on Euro-
pean Air Transport Liberalization datedJune 3, 1997, stressing that monopoly positions
of national carriers are not attributable to advantages obtained in market but to regula-
tion).
2. Ronald Schmid, Introduction, in I EUROPEAN AIR LAW 120 (Elimar Giemulla, et
al. eds., 1998).
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ber State maintained one scheduled airline, in which it had at
least a majority stake and controlling ownership. While this sys-
tem was in place, each Member State had a statutory obligation,
taken on as part of their responsibility to the public, to operate
services on unprofitable routes.
On the domestic level, the national carrier had to be pro-
tected against other scheduled and less regulated charter air-
lines. This protection was mainly achieved by national aviation
laws, which often allowed only one scheduled airline-namely
the "flag" carrier-to operate scheduled services, and stressed
the distinction between charter and scheduled air traffic
through a system of tariffs.3 Tariffs were subject to approval by
the competent aviation authority in each Member State that con-
sidered the public service obligation of the national carrier, and
maintained a high level of airfares. Ticket sales for other airlines
that were below the approved tariffs were prohibited. There-
fore, the national carrier was not subject to competitive pressure
in its pricing scheme.
On the international level, national carriers were protected
against foreign competitors under a regime of bilateral agree-
ments between Member States.4 This system resulted from the
recognition of each Member State's sovereignty over its air space
and, consequently, air services, which were formulated in the
Chicago Convention of 1944' ("Chicago Convention"). Until
the late 1970s, most bilateral agreements explicitly defined the
routes that could be flown, the number of airlines designated by
the two contracting Member States that could operate on these
routes, and also the capacity and frequency of flights. Capacity
was regulated in a variety of ways-for example, through split-
ting capacity between two countries so that each would have a
fifty percent share. The bilateral agreements also provided for
methods of determining airfares, and contained requirements
concerning the ownership of airlines. This system of bilateral
agreements was supplemented by inter-airline pooling agree-
ments and the International Air Transport Association ("IATA")
3. Id. at 22.
4. See WALTER SCHWENK, HANDBUCH DES LUFTVERKEHRSRECHTS 363 (1996); Daniel
C. Hedlund, Toward Open Skies: Liberalizing Trade in International Airline Services, 3 MiNN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 259, 264 (1994).
5. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, ICAO Doc. 7300/6
art. 1.
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Tariff Coordination System, which controlled the fares and rates
charged by the airlines.6 Until 1993, these bilateral agreements
between EC Member States also governed intra-Community air
transport. From the late 1970s to the 1980s, there was a trend
towards more liberal bilateral agreements induced by deregula-
tion of air transport in the United States. One example of this
trend is the United Kingdom-Germany Air Service Agreement of
December 1994, which provides for more liberal route access
and country of origin rules for discount fares.7 This develop-
ment led to different competitive environments for the airlines
from country to country, depending on the attitude of the re-
spective Member State to liberalization.
B. Community Air Transport Regulation
8
The first EC intervention in this system of bilateral agree-
ments came with the first air transport liberalization package in
1987. 9 This package, along with the second liberalization pack-
age,'" which entered into force in 1990, did not set up an EC
system of airline licensing and market access, but merely loos-
ened the constraints of the bilateral agreements between Mem-
ber States. Capacity limitations were eliminated, additional air-
6. PETER MORR.EL, THE SINGLE MARKET REVIEW, IMPACr ON SERVICES, AIR TRANS-
PORT 13 (1997).
7. See Hedlund, supra note 4, at 264 (describing Open Skies agreement between
Netherlands and United States as positive example).
8. The doctrine on liberalization of European Community ("EC" or
"Community") air transport is extensive. See, e.g. Dennis A. Duchene, The Third Package
of Liberalization in the European Air Transport Sector: Shying Away from Full Liberalization 23
TRANsP. L.J. 119 (1995); Jurgen Basedow, Airline Deregulation in the European
Community-Its Background, Its Flaws, Its Consequences For EC-US Relations, 13 J.L. & CoM.
247 (1994); Matthew Driven, Liberalization and Privatization in European Community
Transport Law 6 SPG INr'L LEGAL PERSP. 97 (1994); Bendoit M.J. Swinnen, An
Opportunity for Transatlantic Civil Aviation: From Open Skies to Open Markets?, 63J. AIR L. &
COM. 249 (1997); Frederik S6rensen, A Third Package: What Remains To Be Done?, 3 EUR.
AIR L. ASSN. CONFERENCE PAPERs 87 (1990); Jestaedt/Hohenstatt, Das dritte
Maonahmenbiindel zur Liberalisierung des Luftverkehrs, EuZW 1992, 115.
9. See Council Directive No. 87/601, O.J. L 374/12 (1987) (discussing airfares);
Council Decision No. 87/602, O.J. L 374/19 (1987) (regarding capacity sharing and
market access); Council Regulation No. 3975/87, O.J. L 374/1 (1987) (discussing appli-
cation of competition rules to air transport); Council Regulation No. 976/87, O.J. L
374/9 (1987).
10. Council Regulation No. 2342/90, O.J. L 217/1 (1990) (concerning airfares);
Council Regulation No. 2343/90, O.J. L 217/8 (1990) (discussing market access);
Council Regulation No. 2344/90, O.J. L 217/15 (1990) (regarding application of EC
Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices).
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lines were allowed on routes between the contracting EC Mem-
ber States, and rights to add routes were created. Although
bilateral air service agreements were less restrictive than the orig-
inal EC legislation, they remained applicable.
Only the third European air transport liberalization pack-
age of 1993 replaced the bilateral agreement system with a multi-
lateral system within the Community. The third package essen-
tially consisted of three Council regulations: one on the licens-
ing of air carriers,11 one on market access, 12 and one on fares
and rates.' 3 Under the EC air carrier licensing regulation,
licenses for airline services are still granted by national authori-
ties; however, they are now subject to a set of common rules for
air operator's licensing, enabling access to all air transport
routes within the Community, including cabotage. Additionally,
a system of EC-monitoring of airfares has been established,
which eliminated Member States approval. The national owner-
ship/control requirement was replaced by the concept of a
"Community Carrier." The common European air carrier li-
cense system, however, does not apply to air traffic between EC
Member States and third countries. In this context, the bilateral
air service agreements still apply.
At the same time that the regulatory constraints were re-
moved from bilateral agreements between Member States, the
European Commission (or "Commission") approved a series of
regulations enabling the application of competition rules to un-
dertakings in the air transport sector.1 4 The idea was that regula-
tory restrictions of competition should not be replaced by anti-
competitive behavior by the airlines. The current measures in-
clude Council Regulation No. 3975/87 on the application of the
Competition Rules to Air Transport, 5 and the block exemption
enabling Regulation No. 3976/87 on the application of the
Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted prac-
11. Council Regulation No. 2407/92, O.J. L 240/1 (1992) (regarding licensing of
air carriers).
12. Council Regulation No. 2408/92, O.J. L 240/8 (1992) (regarding market ac-
cess).
13. Council Regulation No. 2409/92, O.J. L 240/15 (1992) (regarding fares and
rates).
14. Lars Gorton, Air Transport and EC Competition Law, 21 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 602
(1998).
15. Council Regulation No. 3975/87, O.J. L 374/1 (1987).
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tices. 16 The application of these procedural rules is, however,
limited to intra-Community air transport. Again, neither regula-
tion applies to air transport between the Community and third
countries. In connection with the competence conflict of the
Commission with the U.S. Department of Justice and Depart-
ment of Transportation in the "BA/AA" and "Star Alliance"
cases, the Commission has, after their first unsuccessful attempt
in 1989,'7 again submitted a proposal for extension of the two
regulations to air traffic with third countries. 8 The new propo-
sal is currently stuck in the Council.
On the basis of Regulation No. 3976/87, the Commission
can issue block exemption regulations regarding certain agree-
ments. The agreements affected by this regulation include joint
planning and coordination of capacity, consultation on tariffs,
slot allocation at airports, computer reservations system ("CRS"),
and ground handling.' 9 Additionally, the Commission has en-
acted other sector specific legislation in the area of slot alloca-
tion, CRS, and ground handling.2"
II. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALIZATION
Slightly more than two years after the implementation of
the last step of the Single Aviation Market in April 1997, when
cabotage was introduced, we are in a position to assess whether
liberalization has been a successful or not. Several empirical
studies have been prepared on this subject. The results of these
16. Id.
17. Application of the Competition Rules to Air Transport, COM (89) 417 Final
(Sept. 1989).
18. See Application of the Competition Rules to Air Transport, COM (97) 218 Fi-
nal (May 1997) (amending Regulation No. 3975/87, O.J. C 165/13 (1987) and laying
down procedure for application of rules on competition to undertakings in air trans-
port); see id. (regarding application of Article 85(3) EC Treaty to certain categories of
agreements and concerted practices in air transport sector between Community and
third countries).
19. The group exemption regulations still in force after the third liberalization
package are enumerated in Louis ORTIZ BLANco & BEN VAN Hou'rrE, EC COMPETITION
LAw IN THE AIR TRANSPORT SECTOR 177 (1996). On the group exemption regulations,
see Konstantinos Adamantoppoulos, Block Exemptions in the Air Transport Sector, 3 EUR.
AIR L. ASS'N 73 (1990).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 27-50 (regarding slot and ground handling
liberalization); see also infra text accompanying note 52 (discussing computer reserva-
tions systems ("CRS")).
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assessments can be summarized as follows. 2 1
A. Liberalization in the Community
Liberalization in the Community has not led to dramatic
changes like those in the United States following deregulation of
air transport. In the United States, there was a substantial de-
crease of airfares, as well as the disappearance of major carriers
followed by a high level of concentration. Nevertheless, there
were notable changes following liberalization of air transport in
the Community, even though they were much less striking than
those changes in the United States.
First, there was above average total growth in air transport
in the Community, particularly in light of the fact that part of
the liberalization process was during an economic recession. Ad-
ditionally, there was growth in the number of routes operated in
the Community, primarily because of the introduction of new
non-stop connections and former charter operators that took up
scheduled services. Moreover, the number of routes operated
increased from 490 in 1992, to 520 in 1996. The number of air-
lines per route only increased in individual cases in high density
routes. Many of the new routes are operated by single carriers.
In 1996, thirty percent of the intra-Community routes were still
served by two operators and only six percent were served by
three operators or more. Sixty-four percent of the routes in the
Community were still operated by monopolies.
Furthermore, the overall number of airlines increased.
Eighty new licenses were granted since the beginning of liberali-
zation. Since this time, however, sixty companies have already
disappeared. As far as airfares are concerned, results have been
varied. While there has been a decrease in airfares on routes
where more than two airlines operate, there have been allega-
tions of predatory pricing in cases where former monopoly carri-
ers are faced with new entrants on certain routes. While many
21. One example is the Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament dated October 22, 1996. See Impact of the Third Package of
Air Transport Liberalization Measures, COM (96) 514 Final (Oct. 1996); see also Recom-
mendations from the Report by the Comit4 des Sages for Air Transport to the Euro-
pean Commission, reprinted in Schmid, supra note 2, Drafts and Proposals E(i)(1.3);
MoRRLL, supra note 6 (discussing study commissioned by European Commission (or
"Commission")); Barton et. al., Networkers of the Future: European Airlines and Deregula-
tion, AiRLINE Bus., May 1995, at 40.
S1752000]
S176 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:$170
discount fares have been introduced, however, many have re-
strictions on schedule flexibility and only apply to a limited
number of seats. On the contrary, fully flexible airfares required
by business travelers have increased following liberalization. On
certain routes, prices even seem to be excessive. Airfares for
cross-border flights tend to be still higher than domestic airfares
on comparable distances.
The number of international alliances between airlines has
increased. It is, however, disputed that this development is at-
tributable to liberalization in the Community. On the contrary,
the number of crossborder mergers appears rather limited. So
far, there has not been a major increase in the use of "hubs" like
those in the United States.2 2
After the recession, which lasted until 1994, most airlines
have recovered and have been profitable since 1995.23 Some na-
tional carriers still have considerable problems adjusting to the
new environment. These carriers try to cope with these required
adjustments by using grants of state aid. Although cost cutting
measures adopted by airlines have been successful, European
airlines are still less profitable than U.S. carriers. The share of
national carriers in total output has also declined; on domestic
routes the share of national carriers, however, decreased from
ninety percent in 1992 to eighty percent in 1996.
In summary, there has been no fundamental challenge to
the flag carriers duopolies and business so far, and flexible
airfares have increased following liberalization. On the other
hand, consumers benefited from promotional fares and the ad-
dition of a number of routes. The phenomenon of discount
airfares has certainly contributed to the increase in overall air
traffic following liberalization.
B. Deregulation in the United States
It is interesting to take a short look at the effects of deregu-
lation in the United States, which initiated a deregulation pro-
22. JOHN H. HUSTON & RIcHARD V. BUTLER, AIRLINE HUBS IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN
MARKET: A BENCHMARK ANALYSIS 8, 407 (1993).
23. For example Lufthansa's financial statements for the first quarter 1998 are sen-
sational. Its regular business profit alone-DM125 million-exceeded the previous
year's record figure by DM105 million. Lufthansa has therefore sustained its excellent
result for 1997 with a pretax profit of DM1.65 billion.
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gram in 1978.24 In the earlier stage of deregulation, there was a
considerable decrease in airfares. Another effect of deregula-
tion, however, was increased concentration of the industry,
which was not resolved by application of antitrust rules. While
the number of airlines had increased from forty-six in 1978 to
123 in 1996, in 1987 ten airlines shared eighty-seven percent of
total airline services, and in 1995, only eight carriers claimed
ninety-three percent of the market. Deregulation also led to the
hub and spoke system. Although this system inconvenienced
passengers who had to cope with travelling on more connecting
rather than direct flights, it proved efficient for the airlines.
This system has led to dominance of a few large carriers at their
respective hubs-market shares of more than seventy percent at
individual hubs and correspondingly high air fares. After price
decreases in the first phase of deregulation, fares have risen
again since 1998 to levels higher than before deregulation. Busi-
ness ticket prices have risen by eighty-six percent in the last five
years. Problems were less striking during the recession, when all
airlines were operating with overcapacities. Now, however, with
a thriving economy accompanied by growth in air traffic, prices
have increased even more. There are several instances of "cut
price" airlines that tried to assert themselves in the market like
Pan Am and Western Pacific, but these reduced fare airlines
were driven out of business again by the major airlines that held
a stronger position in the price wars that took place. Currently,
the U.S. Secretary of Transport is considering an "Airline Com-
petition and Lower Fare Act," which would allow investigations
against such complaints. 25 Some critics claim that deregulation
will be succeeded by times of re-regulation.26
C. Obstacles to Liberalization
There are many reasons why liberalization in Europe has
had only moderate effects on the industry so far. With regard to
24. Severin Borenstein, Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance and Market Power, 80 AEA
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 2, 400 (1990); Andreas Spaeth, U.S. Luftverkehr Ohne Konkur-
renz Explodieren die Preise, BRT TRAWL, Jul.-Aug. 1998, at 14.
25. See Spaeth, supra note 24, at 16.
26. In general, the assessment of U.S. deregulation is positive despite its negative
side effects. See Barry Hawk, United States Regulation of Air Transport, in, TOWARD A COM-
MUNrrY AIR TRANSPORT Pouicv 255 (Piet Jan Slot & Prodromos D. Dagtoglou eds.,
1989); see also Hedlund, supra note 4, at 282; Barton, supra note 21, at 40.
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why liberalization in Europe has only had moderate effects,
many different factors can be mentioned that contribute to the
problem. First, the Commission was influenced by the exper-
iences following the more radical approach to deregulation in
the United States, and therefore took a more gradual ap-
proach.27 One also has to take into account that ten years of
liberalization cannot eradicate a system of protection of national
carriers, which has been practiced for more than four decades.
Additionally, at least parts of the implementation of the liberali-
zation took place during a period of economic recession.28 In
particular, during the Gulf crisis, most airlines incurred losses.
Another contributing factor is that some European airlines are
less influenced by European markets than by global develop-
ments because they depend on air services between the EU and
other parts of the world for more than half of their total reve-
nue.
29
Another serious problem is the limitation of the Commis-
sion's competence to control air transport within the Commu-
nity.3 ° The continued application of bilateral agreements that
protect the national carriers of the contracting parties, by mono-
designation and capacity restrictions on air traffic between EC
and third countries, is a serious obstacle to effective liberaliza-
tion. Bilateral agreements between EC Member States and third
countries that do not allow ownership of designated airlines by
nationals of other Community countries limit the scope of com-
petition on routes between third countries, the EC, and cross-
border equity investments. Aside from differences in bilateral
agreements with third countries, these agreements also distort
competition between carriers operating within the Single Mar-
ket, since some airlines operate on protected markets while
other carriers face competition on all markets where they oper-
ate.
The fact that many airlines are still state-owned and have a
close relationship to the national regulatory authorities is an-
27. Carole A. Shifrin, European Airlines to Enter 21st Century with New Look, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 15, 1993, at 63.
28. See Schmid, supra note 2, at 72-76.
29. See MoRELL, supra note 6, at 1.
30. Basedow, supra note 8, at 272; see Swinnen, supra note 8, at 272 (explaining
impact of liberalization of air transport in Community on third country airlines); Bo
Stable, Non EEC Carriers and the EEC Aviation Policy, 3 EUR. AIR L. Ass'N 45 (1990).
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other obstacle to liberalization." Due to state ownership of the
national carrier, certain Member States, particularly during the
early phase of liberalization, were not willing to implement the
liberalization measures. For example, these Member States em-
ployed tactics such as delaying granting licenses to other non-
State owned airlines.
Another obstacle to liberalization is the continued practice
of state grants of aid to airlines in the Community.3 2 Airlines
that have received state aids include Sabena, Air France, Air
Lingus, Olympic Airways, TAP, Air Portugal, and Iberia. In its
state aid decisions, the Commission has tried to impose condi-
tions on granting state aid to ensure that state aid is used for
restructuring instead of being used for gaining a competitive ad-
vantage. In former decisions, the following conditions have
been imposed by the Commission. First, the Commission re-
quires that the beneficiaries of the cost reductions ensure that
these privileges are necessary for the airline to operate profita-
bly. Next, the Commission imposed requirements for capacity
reductions or constraints on expansion. Additionally, the recipi-
ent must make commitments not to expand their fleets, which
means that the aid is not used to acquire other airlines or to act
as price leader in airfares. Furthermore, individual governments
must give commitments that they will not interfere in the air-
line's management and that they will not grant further aid dur-
ing the restructuring plan. Compliance with the above-men-
tioned conditions, however, is difficult to supervise. For exam-
ple, competitors have repeatedly accused Air France of using
state funds for predatory pricing. From a competition law per-
spective, it would, of course, be best if no state aid was granted at
all, and the Commission has repeatedly confirmed the political
will to phase out state aid to airlines over a relatively short period
of time.
One of the most significant obstacles to successful liberaliza-
tion is airport congestion resulting in slot allocation problems, as
the absence of attractive slots is the main barrier to entry for
competitors on high density routes. Under the current struc-
31. See Hedlund, supra note 4, at 278.
32. See Romano Subiotto, Legal Principles Governing State Aid and the Commission's
Review of State Aid: A Brief Comparison, 9 EUR. AIR L. Ass'N 83 (1995); See also Heinz
Hilbrecht, An Update on the Commission's Activities in the Area of State Aid in the Aviation
Sector, 9 EuR. AIR L. Ass'N 77 (1995).
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ture, national carriers have a competitive advantage since they
own all the attractive slots and have superior access to airport
facilities.33 Therefore, one defense strategy of national carriers
consists of violently defending the current IATA grandfather
rights precedence system in order to block attempts aimed at
confiscating slots for new entrants by invoking expropriation. 4
The legal framework provided for in Council Regulation No.
95/93"5 and Commission Regulation No. 1523/9636 falls short of
solving the problem. Council Regulation No. 95/93 designates
EU airports as either "fully coordinated," if congestion occurs
for significant periods of time, or as "coordinated," if a coordina-
tor is appointed to facilitate the allocation of slots. The regula-
tion is based on the principles of neutrality, transparency, and
non-discrimination.
Grandfather rights are preserved if the carrier concerned
uses at least eighty percent of the slots during a season. Other-
wise, the slots have to be surrendered and put into a pool. With-
drawn and newly created slots are put into this pool, of which
fifty percent are allocated to new entrants. The definition of
"new entrant" in Regulation No. 95/93 is, however, very narrow.
Regulation No. 95/93 permits slot exchanges between carriers
or one carrier on different routes at coordinated airports, but
does not allow their purchase in the absence of an exchange.
Empirical studies on Regulation No. 95/93 have come to
the conclusion that the regulation is not able to solve the entry
barrier problem caused by the scarcity of slots. Proposals for im-
provement differ widely. In one empirical study on the impact
of Regulation 95/93, the "new entrant" definition in the regula-
tion is criticized as being too narrow, and instead, should con-
sider operators with up to ten percent of the daily slots. 7 The
33. See MORRELL, supra note 6, at 26; Schmid, supra note 2, at 102.
34. Das nenneIchEnteignung, 19 DER SPIEGEL 131 (1998) (citing Mr. Jfrgen Weber,
Chief Executive Officer of Lufthansa, regarding alliance with United Airlines). He criti-
cizes the obligation to surrender slots as enteignung, or expropriation.
35. See Council Regulation No. 95/93, O.J. L 14/1 (1993)(regarding common
rules for allocation of slots at Community airports).
36. See Commission Regulation No. 1523/96, O.J. L 190/11 (1996) (amending
Regulation No. 1617/93 on application of Article 85 (3) of EC Treaty to certain catego-
ries of agreements and concerted practices concerningjoint planning and coordination
of schedules, joint operations, consultations on passenger and cargo tariffs on sched-
uled air services, and slot allocation at airports).
37. COOPERS & LYBRAND, THE APPLICATION AND POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OF COUN-
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new entrants should also be given a stronger position to get dis-
tributed slots from the slot pool. Besides, it was found that there
is a need for greater transparency in determining capacity levels
at congested airports and in the slot allocation process itself by
requiring the coordinator to be fully independent of airport au-
thorities, national governments, and airlines. It can be doubted
whether such measures, even if implemented, would solve the
problem. The central issue seems to be that, under the current
Regulation, there will almost never be enough attractive slots in
number and time in the pool to accommodate new entrants.
Studies have shown that most slots at airports are held by the
former national carrier."
Another more far-reaching proposal suggests obliging in-
cumbent airlines by holding a portfolio of slots above a certain
threshold in order to surrender a proportion of those slots to
the scheduling committee.39 Airlines holding more than a cer-
tain percentage of slots at a fully coordinated airport would be
obliged to surrender a fixed percentage to the scheduling com-
mittee either all at once or in phases of several years. This op-
tion could theoretically generate a sufficient number of attrac-
tive slots that could be made available to new entrant airlines.
Priority rules could give preference to new entrants to operate
on monopoly or duopoly routes. This option, however, would
seriously affect the position of the flag carriers and might also
impair their ability to compete globally. Additionally, it might
not be clear to whom the slots belong and whether any compen-
sation would need to be granted in the case of their confiscation
under expropriation rules.4'
Free trading of slots is, as discussed, an alternative model.4"
Auctioning of slots has been practiced at a limited number of
CIL REGULATION 95/93 ON COMMON RULES FOR THE ALLOCATION OF SLOTS AT COMMU-
NITY AIRPORTS, FINAL REPORT 1 (1995).
38. Severin Borenstein, Prospects for Competitive Air Travel in Europe, in SINGULAR
EUROPE: ECONOMY AND POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AFTER 1992 251 (William
James Adams ed., 1995).
39. MORRELL, supra note 6, at 26 (discussing proposal by U.K. Civil Aviation Au-
thority ("CAA"), dated 1993).
40. Crosby, Recent Developments in Slot Allocation, 10 EUR. AIR L. ASS'N 3 (1996)
(favoring ownership of airports).
41. Starkie, Recent Developments in Slot Allocation-What Can We Learn from the U.S.
Market in Airport Slots ?, 10 EUR. AIR L. ASS'N (1996); Christopher Allen, Comments on Slot
Allocation, 10 EUR. AIR L. ASS'N (1996), Karel Van Miert, Competition Policy in the Air
Transport Sector, Speech at the Royal Aeronautical Society, Mar. 9, 1998.
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airports in the United States since 1986. Unfortunately, the U.S.
experience has shown that barriers to entry have increased fol-
lowing slot trades rather than vanished.4 2 Slots are mainly
traded between the incumbent airlines. According to econo-
mists, this result would always be the case since the slots are
more valuable for an incumbent airline than for a new entrant,
so that the former would always pay more.4 3 One has to admit,
however, that a gray market for slots currently exists at certain
airports in the Community. Therefore, it is argued that at least
the transactions that take place in practice should be formally
recognized. 4
The approach of the Community to the problem is still
open, given the expiration of Council Regulation No. 95/93.
Currently, Directorate General IV and Directorate General VII
seem to disagree as to whether slot trades are viable options.4 5
Whereas Directorate General IV strongly opposes trading in
slots, pointing to the adverse affects on competition 46 indicated
by U.S. empirical data, Directorate General VII seems to advo-
cate this approach. The most favorable solution from a legal
point of view would be the expansion of capacity by building new
airports and new terminals. Given that airports are currently fi-
nanced by Member States when budget constraints hit, and that
EC citizens are gaining a stronger environmental awareness, ex-
pansion does not, however, appear to be a viable solution to the
problem.
Closely related to the slot allocation issue is the issue of lib-
eralization of ground handling services. Ground handling serv-
ices amount to a high percentage of airlines' costs and are a
means for airlines to distinguish themselves from competitors by
offering better services. Under the traditional structure, airlines
have no impact on the cost of ground handling which is either
done through public entities-the national carrier-or the air-
port operator itself. Due to their current monopoly situation,
airports tend to operate highly inefficiently, so that costs are
higher than they would be in the presence of competition.
42. See Starkie, supra note 41, at 5; Borenstein, supra note 38, at 251.
43. Pietro Crocioni, The Lufihansa/SAS Case: Did the Commission Get the Economics
Right?, ECLR 116, 122 (1998).
44. See Allen, supra note 41, at 2; Starkie, supra note 41, at 5.
45. EU Briefing, REUTER, Jan. 31, 1997.
46. Van Miert, supra note 41.
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Therefore, it is desirable that ground handling is liberalized in
order to allow airlines to lower their costs and compete globally.
It is clear that in countries where the national carrier is also
responsible for the ground handling, there is potential for dis-
crimination against new entrants that pose a threat to the incum-
bent's position. For example, many airports have discriminatory
discount schemes for landing fees that favor the national carrier
with a high volume of traffic at a particular airport.47 On some
occasions, there have been allegations that inferior services are
offered to foreign airlines at higher prices. In June 1995, the
Council of Ministers (or "Council") rejected a Draft Directive
prepared by the Commission on the Liberalization of Ground
Handling Services 48 due to the opposition of Germany and Aus-
tria. In October 1996, however, the Council adopted Directive
No. 96/97 on access to ground handling services at European
airports. 49 The directive, which aims at opening the ground
handling market to airlines and handling companies, provides
for the freedom of self-handling to be introduced in 1998 and
one year later. Member States, however, are allowed to limit the
number of operators for particular handling components, pro-
vided there are no less than two for each service category. In
case of space and capacity problems, airports can claim exemp-
tions from the obligation to admit other operators. By the end
of 2002, ramp handling monopolies will be completely abol-
ished. A lot will depend on the implementation of this directive.
As has already become apparent in connection with the history
of the draft directive from 1995, some Member States are reluc-
tant to give up public ground handling monopolies. Another
option besides this directive is the enforcement of Article 86 of
the Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty")
against airports engaging in discriminatory or other abusive be-
havior. A recent example is the Commission decision on abusive
practices by the airport in Frankfurt, Germany.5"
47. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 95/364/EC, O.J. L 216/8 (1995) (examin-
ing "Airport Zaventem" on discriminatory discount scheme).
48. Social and Economic Committee, Draft Directive on the Liberalization of
Ground Handling Services, SEC (93) 1896 final; Corrine Dussart-Lefret & Christine
Federlin, Ground Handling Services andEC Competition Rules, 19 AIR k SPACE L. 50 (1994).
49. See Council Directive No. 96/97, O.J. L 272/36 (1996) (regarding access to
market of ground handling services on Community airports).
50. Commission Decision No. 98/67, O.J. L 72/30 (1998).
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III. AIRLINES' STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO LIBERALIZATION
After having described the background of liberalization in
the Community and several problems that impair its implemen-
tation, I would like to draw your attention to several strategies
implemented by former national carriers facing the new phe-
nomenon, "competition" in air transport. Again I start out with
empirical data on what has apparently been the airlines' re-
sponses to air transport liberalization. 51 The question then
arises to what extent competition law can, in the current legal
framework, counter strategies that may be a threat to competi-
tion. Two main strategies can be detected among the different
airlines.
The first strategy consists of pre-emptive moves either to
block market entry by potential competitors, to drive new en-
trants out of the market if they start operating in the carrier's
home market, or increase barriers to entry in the whole market.
Pre-emptive strategies take a variety of forms. The acquisition of
small domestic companies by national carriers is one approach.
Another approach is the conclusion of franchise agreements
with smaller carriers with lower overhead, in particular, in order
to obtain feed traffic. Another method is predatory pricing on
routes, where a competitor starts to operate services on the na-
tional carrier's network. There is also a trend towards vertical
integration with travel agencies and tour operators in order to
widen distribution channels. Besides, there are various instances
of abuses under Article 86 of the EC Treaty such as refusal to
interline.
A second strategy adopted by airlines in the Community is a
general search for size in order to achieve economies of scale,
global marketing, and to obtain a presence in new markets. Size
can be obtained through mergers, equity investments, strategic
alliances, code sharing agreements, and franchise agreements.
Accordingly, all European airlines have implemented cost-cut-
ting measures in order to become fit for global competition.
51. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airlines in Turbulence: Strategies for Survival, 23 TRANsP.
L.J. 15 (1995); Mo~aLL, supra note 6, at 33.
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IV. COMPETITION LAW PRACTICE REGARDING NATIONAL
CARRIERS DEFENSIVE MEASURES
The above-mentioned practices are subject to the enforce-
ment of EC competition rules, at least as far as air transport
within the Community is concerned. The question therefore
arises as to what extent the Commission and Member States
competition law authorities must intervene in order to ensure
competition.12 Of course, a line has to be drawn between prac-
tices harming competition, and practices necessary for the re-
structuring of the Community air transport industry in order to
enable it to compete globally. There are strategies that are
harmful to competition and there are others that are just smart
economic decisions. For example, Lufthansa's strategy to en-
large its domestic network following liberalization certainly was a
preemptive move against potential new entrants who might be
interested in opening cabotage services in the decentralized Ger-
man market, but nothing to be challenged under competition
law. One area where the Commission and Member States au-
thorities were faced with the sensitive balance to be drawn be-
tween global competitiveness and preservation of competition in
the Community was merger control.
A. Merger Control Practice
1. National Merger Cases
Especially in the early phase of liberalization, national carri-
ers had a tendency to acquire small competitors at a national
level. One example is the British Airways/British Caledonian
merger,5" which occurred before the existence of the European
Merger Regulation. The Commission took up an investigation,
but probably due to the financially poor condition of British Cal-
edonian imposed rather limited conditions in connection with
clearance of the merger. British Airways ("BA") had to give up
certain routes and slots at Gatwick Airport to competitors. The
next British case was the acquisition of the independent carrier
Dan Air by BA,54 which the Commission ruled to be beyond the
52. See Basedow, supra note 8, at 276 (discussing competition policy designed for
air transport); EHMER, supra note 1.
53. See Dempsey, supra note 51, at 74.
54. Commission Decision No. IV/M. 278, OJ. C 68/5 (1993) (British Airways/Dan
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scope of the European Merger Regulation. The British Secre-
tary for Trade and Industry subsequently cleared the merger.
British Midland and Virgin Atlantic filed complaints to the Com-
mission to consider whether the clearance by the national au-
thority could be somehow attacked under EC law, but the Com-
mission refused to intervene. Air France brought an action
against the Commission at the Court of First Instance asking to
annul the Commission decision, which was dismissed. Later, BA
acquired Brymon Airlines55 a franchise airline.
In France, Air France bought UTA, another French carrier
mainly operating on overseas routes, and Air Inter, a domestic
French carrier, in 1990.56 At the time, the deal brought the
three biggest airlines in France together and made Air France
the biggest carrier with a market share of more than ninety per-
cent in the French market. The Commission intervened, and
after negotiations an agreement was reached with the French au-
thorities. On the eight most important domestic French routes,
at least one airline not belonging to the Air France group was
permitted to operate. Regarding international routes, it was
agreed that one independent airline would be granted rights to
operate from French airports on high-density routes. Further
commitments concerned making slots available at Charles-de
Gaulle Airport. Besides, Air France was obliged sell its stake in
TAT by 1992.
In Germany, the intended acquisition of Interflug, the for-
mer national carrier of the German Democratic Republic, by
Lufthansa was opposed by the Federal Cartel Office ("FCO") in
1990, which released a notice that the acquisition would not be
approved.5" Since no other buyer was found, the airline went
bankrupt. In 1992, Eurowings emerged from the two regional
carriers, Nfirnberger Flugdienst and RFG Regionalflug GmbH.
In the Netherlands, KLM acquired forty percent of the
shares in the Dutch competitor Transavia in 1989.58 The Com-
mission approved the acquisition due to concessions made by
the Dutch authorities allowing other EC companies outside the
KLM group to compete on KLM routes.
55. See Schmid, supra note 2, at 121.
56. See Dempsey, supra note 51, at 36.
57. See Schmid, supra note 2, at 113.
58. Id. at 117.
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2. International Mergers
Recently more cross-border acquisitions have occurred,
which reflects the airlines' strategy to get a presence in one of
the other Member States with high traffic volume. BA has so far
been the most active airline to pursue this policy, since it has
built up a presence in Germany and France. In 1990, there were
plans by BA and KLM to acquire Sabena. The Commission was
skeptical that there was a need to allow an interest in an airline
by two rather than one competitor, but indicated that it was
ready to find a compromise.59 In the meantime, the parties gave
up their plans for the joint venture. As a next move, BA ap-
proached KLM, but negotiations were later abandoned. In
1992, BA bought a share in the former Delta Air, renamed
Deutsche BA, which was recently increased to 100%, and started
intra-German services. Also in 1992, BA acquired a forty-nine
percent share in TAT, the French Airline. In 1996, BA exercised
an option to acquire the remaining share in TAT.' TAT was a
favorable strategic move by BA, since the airline benefited from
concessions by Air France following its acquisition of UTA and
Air Inter. The Commission allowed the acquisition under the
condition that BA should surrender slots to a carrier wishing to
start a London Gatwick/Paris Charles-de-Gaulle service. In
1997, the Commission cleared the acquisition by BA of another
French carrier, Air Libert6,6 1 mainly active in domestic services.
Given Air France's dominant position in the French domestic
market, the Commission did not impose any conditions on the
clearance of the acquisition.
In 1992, Air France acquired about a thirty-seven percent
share in Sabena.62 The Commission qualified Sabena as a joint
venture falling under the Community Merger Regulation and
cleared the merger against several commitments by the parties
and the respective governments involved. Only two years later,
Air France sold its interest in Sabena to Swiss Air, which acquired
59. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1989, at 84, 108 (1990).
60. Commission Decision No. IV/M.806, (British Airways/TAT) (1996). For an
analysis of the earlier acquisition, compare British Airways v. TAT with Commission
Decision No. IV/M.259, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 7.
61. Commission Decision No. IV/M.857, [1998] - C.M.L.R..
62. Commission Decision No. IV/M.517, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R_ M1 (Air France/
Sabena).
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32.5% of the shares.63 A monopoly situation occurred on several
routes between Belgium and Switzerland. The Commission ac-
cepted commitments on the part of the Belgian and Swiss gov-
ernment to liberalize their bilateral agreements to allow for
multi-designation and to abolish capacity restrictions. Given the
limited availability of slots, it also required commitments on the
part of Swiss Air and Sabena to give up slots, if a new entrant
required them. The commitment also extended to the conclu-
sion of interlining agreements, if requested by new entrants.
Maersk, a Danish carrier, took control of Birmingham Euro-
pean in the United Kingdom, which was the first case of an Euro-
pean airline not being controlled by nationals of the Member
State where it is registered.64 Another crossborder merger was
the acquisition of British Midland by SAS in 1988. In 1997 the
Commission cleared the 100% acquisition of Air UK, a U.K. car-
rier involved in domestic and intra-Community scheduled air
traffic, by KLM without imposing any conditions.65 It also found
that there was a transition merely from joint control to sole con-
trol, since KLM has already had a stake in Air UK before. It
found a considerable addition in market share only on the Am-
sterdam-London route, where the merger led to the highest
share on the route, which was, however, put into perspective by
the fact that competitors like BA also operated on the route.
3. Conditions Imposed By the Commission
The Air France/Sabena decision6 6 is a particularly illustra-
tive example of the types of conditions the Commission has im-
posed on the parties to a merger and on Member States as a
condition to obtain clearance of air transport mergers. The
Sabenajoint venture of Air France and the Belgian state led to a
monopoly situation on the routes between Belgium and France.
The Commission accepted certain commitments on the part of
Air France, Sabena, and the two governments to improve this
situation. With respect to the Brussels/Lyon and Brussels/Nice
63. Commission Decision No. IV/M.616, O.J. C 200/10 (1995) (Swissair/Sabena).
64. See Schmid, supra note 2, at 121.
65. Commission decision dated September 22, 1997, "KLM/Air UK7, Case No.
IV/M.967.
66. See Commission Decision No. 95/404/EC, OJ. C 200/10 (1995) (Swissair/
Sabena) (regarding application of Council Regulation No. 2407/92, O.J. L 239/19
(1995)).
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routes, one of the companies promised to withdraw in favor of
one or several new entrant companies. The corresponding slots
and airport facilities would be guaranteed to the new entrant,
and interlining agreements were to be concluded, if so desired.
With respect to the Brussels/Paris route, other companies would
be allowed to operate equally to Air France and Sabena in com-
parable time zones. This commitment could imply the abandon-
ment of slots of a maximum of ten per day by the parties to the
merger. An interline agreement could be concluded with new
entrants, providing for the possibility to participate in frequent
flyer programs ("FFPs"). The different treatment between the
Brussels/Nice and the Brussels/Lyon routes on the one hand,
and the Brussels/Paris route on the other, was based on the fact
that on the Paris/Brussels route, the Commission took into ac-
count that a certain substitutability existed between aerospace
and locomotive transportation.
Another problem was routes between Turkey/Hungary on
the one side and Brussels/Paris on the other. Due to the long
duration of the flights in question, the Commission considered
the flights from Brussels and Paris to be substitutable. On the
Brussels/Paris/Ankara route, the market share of the parties to
the merger amounted to more than eighty-one percent. On the
Budapest/Brussels/Paris route, the market share was fifty-four
percent. In this respect, commitments were made by the Mem-
ber States, Belgium, and France, to renegotiate their bilateral
agreements with Hungary and Turkey in order to provide for
multi-designation on these routes in favor of French or Belgium
companies not belonging to the parties to the merger. Given
the relatively low volume of traffic on the routes, it was agreed
that multi-designation would only start after exceeding a thresh-
old of 100,000 passengers.
Another problem was the routes between European and
French speaking African countries. Here, the Commission
looked at the bundle of flights departing from the Community
and European Free Trade Association ("EFTA") countries to
these African countries. Due to the long duration of these
flights, good intra-European connecting flights, and the absence
of substitutability from the African side due to lack of flights be-
tween African cities, the Commission considered a whole net-
work of flights. On several routes, the position of Air France/
Sabena was very strong because of traditionally close cultural re-
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lationships between the countries, conservative bilateral air ser-
vice agreements, and a relatively low level of traffic. Commit-
ments in this area were also related to the opening up of compe-
tition to potential new entrants. Air France committed itself to
abandon weekly service from Paris to Kigali and Bujumbura with
the intention of allowing a new entrant to operate on this route.
Also, Sabena committed itself to abandon a weekly service on
several routes. The Belgium and French governments promised
to grant the new entrants traffic rights for their countries and to
renegotiate bilateral agreements with the respective African
states in order to allow for multi-designation.
The Air France-Sabena decision is also a good example of
the Commission taking airport facilities into account in its air
transport merger decisions. Given the fact that Sabena already
controlled up to forty-four percent of Brussels airport's slots, and
the business plan between Air France and Sabena provided to set
up a slot-intensive hub and spoke system servicing seventy-five
European cities from Brussels, the Commission found that the
limited availability of slots might reinforce the dominant posi-
tion of the parties to the merger. Therefore, the parties under-
took to limit themselves for ten years to a number of slots equal
to sixty-five percent of the available slots within any two hour
period at Brussels Airport. Additionally, the Belgian govern-
ment committed itself to allow competitors of the Air France-
Sabena group to establish their own ground handling services.
The Commission also found that the planned hub and spoke
system between Air France and Sabena could lead to a strength-
ening of the dominant position of Air France and Sabena on the
routes between France and Belgium. In the event of an imple-
mentation of the hub and spoke system, the flights of the two
companies would prove most practical for use in transit, and
would make competitors' entry into this market more difficult.
In the Commission's view, one of the barriers to entry has been
that Air France and Sabena had access to the airport facilities in
Brussels for the purpose of operating a hub and spoke network,
which would not be available for competing airlines to operate
at later stage. The Commission, therefore, insisted on a commit-
ment by the French government. According to this agreement,
the French government would have to allow, if competitors so
demanded, a hub and spoke network in northern France compa-
rable to the one planned by Air France and Sabena.
NATIONAL CARRERS
4. Conclusions on Merger Practice
One conclusion that can be drawn from some of the re-
ported national cases is that national authorities have, in several
cases, not proven to be suitable forums for ensuring competition
in the EC market for air transport. The national authorities are
likely to have been ineffective because they seemed to be driven
more by national industrial policy than by competition concerns.
Also, Commission practice has been quite lenient in some cases.
They did not prohibit a single merger. The Commission was
particularly permissive in the early stage of liberalization when
there was very little concentration in the industry. Apparently,
the Commission was driven by the idea that a restructuring of
the European air transport industry was desirable, as it permitted
several mergers that led to substantial increases in market share
on individual routes and relied more on commitments by air-
lines to give up slots, routes, and frequencies. The Commission
also relied on commitments by Member States to accelerate lib-
eralization and renegotiate their bilateral air service agreements.
Where, initially, mergers were primarily national, there recently
has been a growing number of cross-border mergers. These
mergers did not raise any competition law concerns, because
competitors were emerging in the national markets, even
though they were still dominated by the local national carrier.
This trend toward competition is a welcome phenomenon.
The Commission has mainly relied on a narrow market defi-
nition by focusing on the individual route. For the purposes of
merger control, which relates to market structure, this approach
is questionable. The German FCO, for example, adopts a differ-
ent approach in airline merger control cases than in cases of
alleged abuse of a dominant position. In merger cases, it has
defined the relevant product market for an airline merger in
Germany to be all flights within the EU having a German city
either as a point of departure or as a destination. 67 On the con-
trary, in cases of abuse of a dominant position, the FCO defines
the relevant market as the individual route on which the abuse
occurs.i6
67. BKartA, resolution dated May 23, 1989, WIRTSCHAFr UND WETrBEWERB, 2391
["DLT/Sfidavia"].
68. BKartA, resolution dated Februay 19, 1997, WIRTsCHAFr UND WErBEwERB, 2875
["Flugpreis Berlin-Frankfurt/M"].
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Despite its narrow market definition as a point of departure,
however, the Commission has in some cases looked at networks
of routes instead of individual routes and has taken substitutable
means of transport into account. As a result of this strategy, de-
spite the very narrow market definition adopted in many cases,
the Commission does not seem to have taken the resulting high
market shares on the routes as serious as it would have taken
equally high market shares in other sectors. The Commission
seems, at least in part, to acknowledge the natural monopoly the-
ory that on some routes there is only room for one operator due
to lack of traffic. In some instances, it conditioned certain com-
mitments for market access to competitors upon a minimum
number of passengers on the route.
There is also an indication that the Commission has ac-
cepted an increase in market share as a consequence of a
merger against commitments on the part of companies and of
Member States for the purpose of facilitating entry of new com-
petitors on the respective routes by providing the necessary in-
frastructure, e.g., airport facilities and slots. Whether it is
enough to provide the conditions needed for potential market
competitors to enter routes dominated by national carriers is
questionable. For example, in the Lufthansa/SAS case, the slots
the parties had to offer to competitors upon request-due to
Commission intervention-were never requested. One explana-
tion may be that smaller carriers are afraid of entering into com-
petition with large national carriers, even if they have the oppor-
tunity to do so. Since the commitments given by parties and
Member States in merger cases are often quite complex, it is dif-
ficult to supervise the parties' compliance, e.g., the renegoti-
ation of bilateral agreements. Enforcement of competition
rules, therefore, depends at least in part on competitors' com-
plaints being taken up by the Commission. In summarizing
Commission practice, one could say that it has not been easy to
make the European aviation industry fit for global competition
while, at the same time, preserving competition at the Commu-
nity level. It may become easier in the future, when it is possible
to assess the effects of commitments made by the parties to the
merger and Member States that have been accepted in the past
by the Commission as a condition for clearance.
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B. Airline Ownership Requirements
Since Commission practice cannot really be found to deter
airlines from cross-border mergers, the question is why more
mergers between carriers in different Member States have not
occurred following liberalization. The major impediment to
cross-border mergers are the regulatory requirements regarding
ownership in an airline at the national level and at the level of
the bilateral air service agreements between EC Member States
and third countries.69 Before entry into force of the Community
carrier license regulation,7 ° which states that any EC national
carrier may own and control any other EC carrier, there were, in
each EC Member State, national airline licensing regulations.
These regulations provided for national ownership and control
of a licensed carrier within the Community. The notion of "con-
trol" was interpreted somewhat differently from country to coun-
try, but it was generally thought that no more than twenty-five to
thirty percent of the airline's voting capital could be controlled
by a non-domestic airline.
The national ownership requirement can also be found in
bilateral air service agreements. Whereas the Chicago Conven-
tion does not provide for national ownership of airlines, only for
nationality of aircraft, the standard form bilateral air services
agreement71 does refer to nationality of airlines.72 The reason at
the time was probably national security, given the fact that World
War II was still in progress.73 Another reason may be that the
national ownership requirements serve to ensure that the bene-
fits from the negotiated air traffic rights only accrue to the coun-
tries that negotiated the agreement. The Chicago Convention
has led to a system of nationality in aircraft ownership and air-
line ownership.
69. Ludwig Weber, EEC Liberalisation Policy and the Chicago Convention, 3 EUR. AIR L.
ASS'N 17, 28 (1990); Hugh O'Donovan, Flags ofConvenience-A GrowinglssueforEuropean
Air Transport?, 9 EUR. AIR L. ASS'N 63 (1995); John Balfour, Hying the Flag-The Role of
Nationalism in Air Transport, 3 EuR. AIR L. ASS'N 53 (1990); Chapatte, The Alliance Between
SAS and Lufthansa-A Model for Future Cooperation Between Airlines in Europe, 10 EUR. AIR
L. Ass'N (1996).
70. See supra note 11.
71. This agreement was included in the final act of the Chicago Conference and
the two agreements, which accompanied the Convention, known as the "Two-Freedoms
Agreement" and the "Five-Freedoms Agreement."
72. See Balfour, supra note 69, at 54.
73. Id.
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While the national airline ownership requirement has been
replaced by the EC licensing regulation requirement of "EC
ownership" of airlines in the Community, which provides that
every EC-licensed airline must be owned and controlled by EC
nationals,74 the national aircraft registration provisions still ap-
ply.75 The main problem, however, is that national ownership
requirements persist in bilateral air service agreements between
Member States and third countries. 76 Despite EC licensing regu-
lations, an acquisition of another carrier in the Community re-
mains unattractive due to the threat of losing national airline
status under the bilateral agreement between the home state of
the airline and third countries. If the target airline operates
flights to non-Community countries, then the nationality re-
quirements in the bilateral agreements do not provide for exten-
sion to another Community carrier. Often, the national laws of
third countries reinforce such ownership requirements, e.g.,
U.S. regulation.77
This situation seems to be the reason why, so far, most cross-
border investments in other airlines in the Community have
been limited to minority stock ownership. One can argue that
the Community air transport industry is restructuring despite
this requirement, since airlines have turned towards global alli-
ances as a means to reduce costs and increase their networks.
Critics, however, anticipate that these alliances have a smaller
incentive to last in the long run than equity investments. It
would be better to have a range of possibilities for restructuring
that consists of mergers and strategic alliances.
Given the present unsatisfactory situation, it is desirable that
the dispute on the Commission's competence regarding third
countries air transport will be resolved soon and that its mandate
to negotiate open sky agreements with third countries will be
renewed. If these actions occurred, then the Commission could
negotiate bilateral agreements with third countries and desig-
nate EC carriers. Since capital infusions by foreign companies
may prove productive in the restructuring of the European avia-
74. An interesting decision on how the EC ownership of airlines is interpreted is
the Commission Decision No. 95/404/EC, O.J. L 239/19 (1995) (Swiss Air/Sabena).
75. See Weber, supra note 69, at 24; O'Donovan, supra note 69, at 66.
76. See Basedow, supra note 8, at 272.
77. See Thomas D. Grant, Foreign Takeovers of United States Airlines: Free Trade Process,
Problems, and Progress, 31 HI-tv. J. LEGIS. 63 (1994) (discussing U.S. legal framework).
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tion industry, third country equity investments in new carriers
should be allowed, subject to reciprocity. This restriction would
apply particularly to the United States. Although the pertinent
U.S. law leaves some discretion as to what "national ownership"
means, KLM was denied a minority equity interest in Northwest-
ern Airlines and BA encountered difficulties in obtaining a stake
in U.S. Air.78
C. Alliances
Given the above mentioned regulatory straightjacket, the
airlines have pursued a strategy of global alliances instead of
mergers, particularly involving U.S. carriers. The frequency of
these mergers is due to the European airlines' belief that they
need a U.S. partner and the U.S. carriers' interest in obtaining
feed traffic from different countries in the EU.79 Since these alli-
ances cooperate on fares, frequencies, schedules, and relation-
ships with travel agencies, they are often very similar to mergers
in their effects.80 The companies that operate in this coopera-
tive manner can effectively eliminate all competition between
them.
1. Types of Alliances
The word "alliances" is not a legal term, and many different
types of these arrangements exist. One can distinguish several
broad categories, e.g., market oriented and cost oriented alli-
ances."' Market oriented alliances involve joint scheduling
("code share agreements"), hub coordination, code sharing,
blockspacing, and FFP combinations. Their goal is mainly to in-
crease traffic and market share. On the contrary, cost oriented
alliances aim at reducing cost by means of joint ventures, recip-
rocal sales, catering and maintenance joint ventures, and asset
sharing. Most European airlines currently focus on the first al-
ternative.
Another categorization distinguishes between strategic and
tactical alliances. Strategic alliances usually comprise a range of
78. Id. at 115.
79. Peter Flint, If You Can't Beat Them, in AIR TRANSPORT WORLD 34 (1996).
80. Van Miert, supra note 41.
81. See MoRELL, supra note 6, at 35; See Impact of the Third Package of Air Trans-
port Liberalization Measures, COM (96) 514 Final, at 19 (1996).
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activities where the airlines plan to cooperate in the long run.
Tactical alliances are short-term and focus on one particular
area of cooperation, e.g., code sharing on one route. Some alli-
ances are accompanied by minority equity investments in order
to make the alliance more stable.
Code share agreements, which can be practiced in the
framework of a more far reaching alliance or by itself, offer sub-
stantive advantages in selling, in particular with respect to CRS
displays. Code sharing essentially means that one airline puts its
code on another airline's flight, having the effect that the flight
can be marketed as if it were operated by the other airline. By
that means, different connecting flights can be offered as one
direct flight.
Franchising, another form of cooperation, has been success-
fully launched by BA in the United Kingdom. A major carrier
licenses its livery, style, and brand name to a smaller carrier that
can operate at lower costs, particularly by reducing staff costs,
accompanied by code sharing. It can, therefore, operate on
otherwise unprofitable routes and provide the major carrier with
feed traffic.
2. Commission Practice: Star Alliance/British Airlines/
American Airlines
There have always been alliances in the industry, but for a
long time the Commission has not been very active in this area.
Recently, however, alliances have become more and more strate-
gic. Due to a bundle of different alliances involving interna-
tional carriers, they have now reached a scale, in particular in
transatlantic air traffic, which raises competition law concerns.8 2
While the Commission has acknowledged in principle the bene-
ficial character of such arrangements by offering more extensive
networks and decreasing costs, it also stresses that alliances may
have detrimental effects on competition, since they may raise
barriers to entry.
The most recent examples of Commission practice on alli-
ances are the procedures under Article 89 of the EC Treaty by
the Commission concerning the alliance between BA and Ameri-
82. See Van Miert, supra note 41; Karel Van Miert, Intervention Devant la Commis-
sion Transports du Parlement Europ6en on "British Airways/American Airlines", (Feb.
25, 1997); Der Spiegel, Luftfahrt: "Das nenne Ich Enteignung," 19 HErr 130 (1998).
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can Airlines ("AA") and the alliance between Lufthansa, United
Airlines, and SAS. In these two cases, it has issued notices in
which it proposes appropriate measures to bring an alleged in-
fringement of Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty to an end, as far as
the alliances relate to air transport services between Europe and
the United States.8" In the case of the BA/AA alliance, the Com-
mission also referred to Article 86 of the EC Treaty on the hub
routes, because the market share of the alliance was more than
sixty percent on all U.K/U.S. routes. The measure suggested
comprises in both cases a reduction in frequencies on certain
transatlantic routes with a high traffic volume during a period of
six months from the first day of the IATA season following the
adoption of the Commission decision; only, however, competi-
tors must request it in order to enable them to operate up to
fifty-five percent of the frequencies on the relevant route. The
giving up of frequencies is subject to certain conditions that
must be fulfilled.
The alliances must surrender, without compensation, a
number of slots corresponding to the number of frequencies
they must give up-if there are not enough slots available in ac-
cordance with ordinary allocation mechanisms. The alliances
also must give up the corresponding airport facilities, if needed
in connection with giving frequencies to a competitor. The obli-
gation to make slots available also extends to slots in the United
States. No slots must be transferred for passengers who are not
time sensitive, since the Commission only adopts the narrow
route market definition for business travelers. Aside from the
situation on the hub-to-hub routes, the alliances must give up
slots and corresponding airport facilities if a competitor wishes
to launch or expand a new or existing service on a particular
cross-border route but cannot get access to the necessary slots
either in Europe or in the United States. Up to fifty-five percent
of the total number of slots must be made available to competi-
tors. The times of slots given up must correspond to the request
of the new entrant. Slots must be allocated on the basis of the
criteria laid down in Commission Regulation No. 95/93.84 The
notices provide for a maximum number of slots to be given up
83. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 239/4, at 5 (1998) (concerning alliance be-
tween SAS, Lufthansa, and United Airlines); Commission Notice, O.J. C 239/5, at 10
(1998) (concerning alliance between British Airways and American Airlines).
84. See Commission Regulation No. 95/93, OJ. L 14/1 (1993).
S1972000]
S198 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:$170
including hub-to-hub routes. The alliances should also commit
themselves to conclude interlining agreements with new en-
trants. Regarding FFPs, the Commission suggests two options:
the parties to the alliance renounce to pooling their FFPs and
refrain from allowing passengers to transfer points obtained be-
tween the alliance members' FFPs, or the alliance allows airlines
without comparable FFPs to participate in the joint FFP of the
alliance. The Commission also considers conditions in the field
of CRS. They are concerned that the double appearance of a
flight of the alliance on the computer screen may lead to a disad-
vantage in selling for competitors regarding flights on high fre-
quency routes because the first screen would be filled. Another
concern of the Commission aims at the common policy prac-
ticed by the alliances vis-A-vis travel agents in Germany and in the
United Kingdom to implement a system of remuneration, e.g., a
sales threshold system, which has the object or effect of securing
the loyalty of travel agents to the members of the alliance on the
relevant markets. Also, the terms of fares offered to large cus-
tomers should not be based on the threshold system or any other
system encouraging loyalty.
As in merger cases, the Commission has also asked for com-
mitments on the part of the Member States to extend traffic
rights under the air service agreements with the United States to
other airlines established in the Community or European Eco-
nomic Area ("EEA") besides airlines owned by nationals of the
respective Member State. The resulting alliances would allow for
a sufficient degree of potential competition. The problem, how-
ever, is that the consent of the U.S. authorities on such an exten-
sion of the bilateral air service agreements will be necessary.
The regimes discussed earlier should, in the view of the Commis-
sion, be applied for five years and then be reexamined.
The interested parties have thirty days following the publica-
tion of notice before the Commission's decision. If the compa-
nies accept the conditions of the final decision of the Commis-
sion, which will be drafted later, then the procedure is closed. If
they do not, then it will be up to the Member States' authorities
to enforce the Commission decision under Article 89 of the EC
Treaty. The Commission must initiate proceedings under Arti-
cle 169 of the EC Treaty if they fail to do so. The British author-
ity had given the BA/AA alliance provisional approval on the
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basis of giving up 168 slots.85 Therefore, a conflict of compe-
tence did arise between the Commission and the British author-
ity. The BA/AA alliance will also be examined by the U.S. anti-
trust authority, which still must give its opinion.8 6 The Star Alli-
ance is covered by the open skies agreement concluded between
the United States and Germany and therefore enjoys U.S. anti-
trust immunity.87
Other examples of alliances currently under examination
are KLM/Northwest Airlines, which is enjoying U.S. antitrust im-
munity, and Sabena/Austrian Airlines/Swiss Air/Delta Airlines.
The alliance of Lufthansa/SAS had been exempted before being
subject to certain conditions. 88 Maersk and Finnair sought clear-
ance by the Commission regarding a cooperation on passenger
and cargo traffic on the Copenhagen-Stockholm route. Another
Article 89 procedure initiated from the Commission concerns
the Air France/Delta Airlines/Continental Airlines alliance.
3. Criticism of the Commission's Alliance Proposals
Lufthansa has denounced the remedies announced by the
Commission as "draconian" and pointed to the fact that the alli-
ance was in operation for four years. The alliance had been ap-
proved two years ago by the U.S. Departments of Justice and
Transportation.89 It criticized the "bureaucratic" intervention by
the Commission to reduce frequencies as a "restriction of com-
petition" since the purpose of the alliance was to offer additional
services. It indicated that the competitiveness of European air-
lines would suffer if the conditions were implemented. It did
not rule out an action against the coming Commission decision.
BA and AA have, with the exception of some reservations,
claimed to accept the conditions imposed.9" During the proce-
dure, the parties claimed precedence of their national author-
ity's decision under Article 88 of the EC Treaty. They also criti-
cized the split market definition focusing on direct routes for
time sensitive business travelers on the one hand and the trans-
85. EU Briefing, REUTER, Feb. 25, 1997.
86. Europe No. 7258, AGENCE EUROPE, July 8, 1998, at 10.
87. Id.
88. Commission Decision No. 96/180, O.J. L 54/28 (1996); Crocioni, supra note
43, at 116.
89. Europe, No. 7260, AGENCE EUROPE, July 10, 1998, at 10.
90. Id.
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port of passengers using indirect flights between the United
Kingdom and the United States on the other. The parties to the
merger take the view that the Commission should have based its
conclusions on only one market definition, taking into account
indirect connections. The British authorities responsible for the
enforcement of the decision have announced their intention of
authorizing the alliance on the basis of the Commission's sugges-
tions. They, however, also await authorization from the U.S. an-
titrust authorities and the signing of the new open sky agree-
ment with the United States. Washington has already indicated
that its approval of the alliance will be contingent upon the sig-
nature of the new agreement on the liberalization of air trans-
port, which will supersede the old agreement with the United
Kingdom that allegedly favors the United Kingdom." Competi-
tors, such as Virgin Atlantic and Continental Airlines, described
the Commission decision as inadequately lenient, and as alleg-
edly leaving the BA/AA alliance with a market share of sixty per-
cent between the United States and the United Kingdom. A
problem with the decision is that de facto competition will only
be possible for companies taking part in bilateral agreements
concluded by Member States with the United States. In the pre-
vious case, Lufthansa/SAS slots had not been requested by com-
petitors, which may be interpreted as sign that smaller compa-
nies lack the courage to face competition by big alliances. 2
4. Conclusion on Article 89 Practice
The Commission has adopted the same approach for exam-
ining alliances as it did for merger control. It has looked at the
overall level of concentration in the market on the one hand,
and at the level of competition on the individual route on the
other. Also, the remedies it has suggested are the same as in
previous merger cases. Its practice has been essentially permis-
sive. Despite quite serious concerns about eliminating competi-
tion on certain routes, it has not prohibited the alliances, but
instead imposed conditions to allow market entry. This permis-
siveness shows that the Commission acknowledges the need to
restructure the European industry, which had already been rec-
ognized in the Report of the Sages on European Air Transport
91. EU Briefing, REUTER, Feb. 25, 1997.
92. Europe No. 7259, AGENcE EUROPE, July 9, 1998, at 6.
NATIONAL CARRIERS
in 1994.9"
Competition law enforcement is difficult for the Commis-
sion due to its limited powers under Article 89 of the EC Treaty,
regarding air traffic with third countries, and the parallel compe-
tencies of Member States under Articles 88 and 89 of the EC
Treaty, in light of the absence of procedural rules under Article
87 of the EC Treaty for application of competition rules to air
transport with third countries. On the contrary, Regulation No.
3975/87 only extends to intra-Community transport. In the ab-
sence of such procedural rules, the transitory regime of Articles
88 and 89 of the EC Treaty applies, in which both the Commis-
sion and Member States authorities can become active partici-
pants in the process, thus ensuring that the Commission must
cooperate with Member States. After a first attempt in 1989, the
Commission has made a second attempt to extend Regulation
No. 3975/87 and Regulation No. 3976/87 to air traffic with third
countries. These proposals, although favored by the European
Parliament, are stuck in Council due to the conflict of power
between Member States and the Commission in the air transport
sector. The limited role of the Commission under the transi-
tional provision of Article 89 of the EC-Treaty is inadequate for
an active implementation of the competition rules. Also, the
Commission's mandate to negotiate a European open sky agree-
ment with the United States has been set aside by the Council so
far.9 4 The Commission has, in the meantime, initiated infringe-
ment proceedings against eight Member States that have con-
cluded open sky agreements with the United States.9 5
From an economic perspective, the Commission's assump-
tion that the cost savings achieved will enable the airlines to
lower fares is questionable. Economists only seem to understand
potential for economies of scale in the presence of hub-and-
spoke systems." Since there is not much hope for such networks
in Europe, the argument that airlines' cooperation with each
93. Recommendations form the Report by the Comiti des Sages for Air Transport to the Euro-
pean Commission, reprinted in 1 EUROPEAN AIR LAw E(i) (1.3) (Elimar Giemulla, et al.,
eds., 1998).
94. For an analysis of the legal basis for Commission external competence, see
Close, External Competence for Air Policy in the Third Phase-Trade Policy or Transport Policy?,
3 EUR. AIR L. ASS'N 31 (1990);John Balfour, Open Skies Agreements with the U.S.--A Ques-
tion of Legality, 9 EUR. AIR L. ASS'N 25 (1995).
95. Internal Market, No. 2299, EUROPEAN REP., Mar. 14, 1998, at 12.
96. See HUSTON & BUTLER, supra note 22, at 407; Crocioni, supra note 43, at 118.
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other, instead of competition, will result in cost reduction,
should be critically reviewed. So far the Commission has not
found a way to distinguish between welfare-improving agree-
ments and agreements that merely restrain competition.
Another issue concerns the barriers to entry identified by
the Commission. In some decisions, it seems that the Commis-
sion considers the mere size of an alliance and its economic
strength as a barrier to entry. From an economic perspective,
however, only economies of scale, along with sunk costs, can
constitute a barrier to entry.97 The barrier to entry at issue in air
transport is airport congestion and scarcity of slots. One could,
however, argue that alliances, as an investment in capacity, may
reinforce the effect of an existing barrier to entry as entry deter-
ring behavior. The Commission has also used this argument by
referring to enhancing the airlines' market position by control-
ling a substantial portion of the slots at main airports in Europe.
This view is supported by empirical data that shows that the exist-
ence of a hub and spoke system, which consumes more slots
than a network of direct routes, has a deterrent effect on new
entrants.98 Therefore, the Commission was probably right in
contemplating frequency freezes and access to the incumbents'
FFPs in order to avoid a reinforcement of the existing barrier to
entry consisting in capacity constraints.
5. U.S. Practice
U.S. authorities have also been applying their competition
law to alliances between European and U.S. airlines with the pur-
pose of executing open skies agreements with Member States.99
The different approach taken by the U.S. Department of Trans-
port and that taken by the U.S. Department of Justice as op-
posed to the European Commission on transatlantic alliances
was already visible when the Lufthansa/United Airlines agree-
ment was granted antitrust immunity. The U.S. authorities sup-
port alliances and are willing to grant antitrust immunity, pro-
vided that an open sky agreement is entered into with the
United States, by the home state of the non-U.S. partner. The
97. See Crocioni, supra note 43, at 121.
98. Robert A. Sinclair, An Empirical Model of Entiy and Exit in Airline Markets, 10 REv.
INDUS. ORG. 541 (1995).
99. See Scott Kimpel, Comment, Antitrust Considerations in International Airline Alli-
ances, 63 J. AIR L. & CoM. 475 (1997) (focusing particularly on jurisdictional issues).
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rationale is that if an open skies agreement applies, then new
entry by other carriers is possible and a competitive environment
can be maintained. 0 0 Antitrust immunity is used as an incentive
for other countries to open their markets to the United States.
In the Lufthansa/United Airlines case, the U.S. authorities
granted immunity after analyzing U.S./German city pairs and
the overall U.S./German market subject to the following condi-
tions: immunity does not apply to cooperation between the two
airlines with respect to their overlapping non-stop services, i.e.,
Chicago to Frankfurt does not cover the activities of Lufthansa/
United Airlines as owners of CRS. In addition, the parties must
withdraw from participation in any IATA tariff conferences for
the routes between the United States and Germany, and other
countries whose designated carriers have similar alliances with
U.S. airlines and have been or are granted antitrust immunity.
After examining slot availability at German airports, in particular
at the Frankfurt airport, the U.S. Department of Transportation
found that slot restrictions would not be a constraint on new en-
try. Whereas the Commission has suggested more measures be
conducted to ensure market entry, the U.S. authorities have, in
essence, concluded that cooperation should not extend to non-
stop routes, where both carriers compete, but beyond that they
have been reluctant to take measures to facilitate market entry.
The main problem with open sky agreements between the
United States and individual Member States is that only carriers
from the respective state come into consideration as new en-
trants on transatlantic routes. Due to the smaller size of Euro-
pean countries and the former national carrier system, a situa-
tion exists in many countries where there are not many airlines
competing with the former national carrier. Therefore, an ex-
tension of the traffic rights agreements to Community carriers
would be necessary for them to have an equal opportunity to
benefit from open skies on both sides.
6. Pricing
The fact that following liberalization fully flexible airfares
for the time-sensitive business traveler have increased,1"1 whereas
on certain routes, aggressive discount schemes have been intro-
100. Id. at 510.
101. Heft, Gnadenlosgeschr6pft, 25 DER SPIEGEL 118 (1998); Internal Market No. 2135,
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duced, suggests that another strategy of incumbent airlines is to
cross-subsidize between routes where they face no competition,
and on routes where they intend to drive new entrants out of the
market. The Commission may intervene under Article 86 of the
EC Treaty and Article 7 of Council Regulation No. 2409/92
against excessively high airfares.'0 2 Theoretically, the Commis-
sion can also intervene against predatory pricing on individual
routes on the basis of Article 86 of the EC Treaty. We know,
however, that in practice, complaints of competitors against
predatory pricing hardly ever succeed. A more recent example
is a complaint by Easy-Jet, a U.K. cut-price carrier, against KLM
at the Commission regarding airfares on the London-Amster-
dam route. 10 3
D. Frequent Flyer Programs
FFPs also form part of a national carrier's defense strategies.
They are an excellent means to create customer loyalty.10 4 In
the view of the Commission, they form a barrier to entry for new
entrants with a small route network.10 5 Potential passengers who
are already members of the incumbent's FFP will not switch to
the small carrier. If the new entrant opens its own FFP account
system, then it will not be likely to win passengers either, since its
network will be smaller compared to other major carriers, which
offer more opportunities to earn miles. Another way of viewing
this problem, other than from the entrant-incumbent perspec-
tive, is to consider FFPs' impact between carriers of the same size
in the EC.' °6 Given the present structure of European airlines,
where former national carriers have a strong presence in their
home market and a less developed presence in other parts of the
Community, the impact of FFPs is difficult to assess. On the one
EUROPEAN REP., May 29, 1996; on the needs and expectations of business travellers, see
IATA CORPORATE AIR TRAVEL SURVEY, AVIATION INFORMATION & RESEARCH (1996).
102. The Commission suggested draft Guidelines regarding the examination of
Air Fares to Art. 7 in November 1992, see Schmid, supra note 2, Drafts and Proposals
E(i) (1.1).
103. Business Brief No. 2253, EUROPEAN REp., Sept. 24, 1997, at 6.
104. Eriksen, Frequent Flyer Programmes, How Do They Work and What Are the Legal
Issues?, 10 EUR. AIR L. Ass'N (1996); Kofmann, Frequent Flyer Programmes, How Do They
Work and What Are the Legal Issues?, 10 EURL AIR L. Ass'N (1996).
105. Drabbe, Frequent Flyer Programmes Competition Aspects, 10 EUR. AIR L. Ass'N 1
(1996).
106. Id. at 4.
NATIONAL CARRIERS
hand, FFPs contribute to national carriers' already strong posi-
tion in their home markets, leading to price increases in order
to recoup the costs incurred by operating FFPs; on the other
hand, this marketing tool may be helpful in attracting passen-
gers outside the carrier's home state and help reinforce their
presence in other areas of the Community, as well as contribute
to the development of a European airline industry. The third
perspective suggested by the Commission is to look at the poten-
tial impact of FFPs on competition between Community and
non-Community carriers. 107 On markets where competition be-
tween EC-carriers and third country carriers is high, such as on
the transatlantic routes, the anti-competitive effect will, in gen-
eral, be limited. If, however, several strong alliances have joint
FFPs, then the situation changes. Since the assessment of FFPs
depends on the level of competition in the markets concerned, a
general legislative approach is currently not considered by the
Commission. The Commission will mainly rely on applying Arti-
cle 86 of the EC Treaty, which allows a case-by-case assessment of
whether an abuse is present.10 8 They will also consider a code of
conduct for FFPs, if it should turn out that the market domi-
nance threshold is too high to preserve competition. In case of
pooling FFPs, Article 85 of the EC Treaty applies, since pooling
FFPs may be considered an indirect means of price fixing. One
must bear in mind that FFPs, as such, are not a barrier to entry,
since the size that makes airlines attractive as an FFP operator is
theoretically reproducible. They just reinforce the effect of air-
port congestion. Given the fact that FFPs may have both positive
and negative effects on competition, the flexible approach cur-
rently adopted by the Commission seems adequate.
E. Computerized Reservation Systems
A CRS is an important method to distribute air services, and
therefore, plays a key role in competition. Through the CRS,
customers are provided with immediate access to information on
carriers' schedules and fares, and this system allows instantane-
ous booking. The CRS can also be used, however, to prevent or
inhibit competition. Competition can be prevented through
either discriminatory practices that prevent or limit access to the
107. Id. at 5.
108. Id. at 10.
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CRS facilities, or by an architectural bias, which the CRS is
designed to provide more reliable information on flights of the
carriers owning the CRS than for their competitors. Also, the
market for the CRS is very concentrated. A set of rules tries to
ensure competition between different CRS types.10 9 For exam-
ple, airlines must not be prevented from participating in other
systems. Travel agents must not be prevented from participating
in another system, to terminate their participation with due no-
tice, or be exposed to incentives to use a particular CRS instead
of others. In order to allow market entry by new providers, the
Commission obtained undertakings from major airlines with an
interest in CRS to participate on a non-discriminatory basis in
competing CRS models. The result was a regulation imposing
an obligation on airlines owning a CRS not to interfere with a
competing CRS by refusing that CRS to distribute its services
under the same conditions as its own. Although both the Code
of Conduct and the Group Exemption Regulation aim toward
eliminating anti-competitive abuse of the system, a 1997 report
by the Council following complaints by companies alleging dis-
criminatory use of CRS by their parent carriers suggests that fur-
ther amendments may be made to the Code of Conduct.110
Some people also suggest that there should be restrictions on
double display of code shared flights, an issue that was also
raised by the Commission in the Star Alliance and BA/AA alli-
ance cases. This report has led to a proposal to amend the
Council Code of Conduct for CRS."1
F. Discount Schemes to Travel Agents
In 1996, Virgin Atlantic launched a complaint against dis-
count schemes practiced by BA in favor of travel agents and cor-
porate clients. 1 2 The Commission sent a statement of objec-
tions to BA expressing doubt regarding the compatibility with
109. Council Regulation No. 3089/93, O.J. L 278/1 (1993) amending Council
Regulation No. 2299/89 on a code of conduct for computerized reservation systems.
110. Report on the Application of Council Regulation No. 2299/89/EEC on a
Code of Conduct for Computerized Reservation Systems, COM (97) 246 Final.
111. Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Council Regulation No. 2289/
89 (1997) on a Code of Conduct for Computerized Reservation Systems COM (97) 246
final (July 1997).
112. Business Brief No. 2307, EUROPEAN REP., Apr. 10, 1998, at 5; Business Brief No.
2268, EUROPEAN REP., Nov. 15, 1997, at 3; Europe No. 7062, AGENCE EUROPE, Sept. 20,
1997, at 11.
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Article 86 of the EC Treaty. In July 1998, BA introduced an even
more aggressive performance reward scheme providing agencies
a means to allow it to maintain its previous level of revenues on a
month-by-month basis by outperforming the sales of BA flights
in the corresponding month of the previous year. The Commis-
sion insisted that binding agents to an airline on a year-by-year
basis amounted to discriminatory incentives when applied by a
dominant company. Since distribution is an important factor in
an airline's success and can be used to render market access to
new entrants more difficult, the Commission must monitor anti-
competitive behavior regarding CRS and travel agent incentive
schemes closely.
G. Abuses Under Article 86 of the EC Treaty
In addition to the above-mentioned defensive strategies of
incumbent airlines, there have been several individual cases of
anti-competitive behavior in which the incumbent airlines made
use of their dominant position in the home market against new
entrants. One example of such behavior is the refusal to inter-
line, which was one of the controversial issues in the British Mid-
land/Air Lingus case."' In this case, Air Lingus terminated an
interlining agreement with British Midland after the latter en-
tered the Dublin-London route. The Commission found that
there was an abuse of a dominant position, since Air Lingus' re-
fusal to interline constituted a significant handicap on competi-
tors by raising their costs, depriving them of revenue, and caus-
ing damage to the new entrant's image. National carriers have,
due to their privileged positions that date back to times of regu-
latory protectionism, a variety of options to harm competitors.
Only a resolved application of Article 86 of the EC Treaty can
counteract such anti-competitive behavior.
CONCLUSION
Air transport liberalization in the Community has so far
been a step in the right direction, but a single aviation market is
far from being accomplished. In part, liberalization has been a
success already, as seen in the introduction of many discount
fares and a network of additional routes offered. In some re-
113. Commission Decision No. 213/92/EEC, O.J. L 96/34 (1992); see Crocioni,
supra note 43, at 121 (explaining Commission's decision).
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spects, however, improvements are desirable. National carriers'
monopolies over many routes have not really been challenged so
far. There may be routes that cannot accommodate an addi-
tional operator, since traffic density is low. For many routes,
however, that argument does not apply. Given this situation, it is
the Commission's task to identify and remove barriers to entry
and supersede national regulation, such as in the ground han-
dling sector, which protects the incumbent airlines. Member
States' authorities should join in such an attempt, although so
far, most have been rather supportive of their own national carri-
ers. As far as the infrastructure problem of airport congestion is
concerned, the Community institutions will have to find a way to
ensure that sufficient slots are available for new entrants on mo-
nopoly or duopoly routes in Europe. The Commission should
continue its practice to try to ensure market access by potential
competitors in the framework of mergers and alliances, and re-
view earlier experiences in earlier cases with commitments by
the parties to the merger and Member States.
One central goal that must be pursued in the next phase of
liberalization of European air transport is the application of EC
competition law. National carriers continue to pursue all kinds
of different strategies to preserve their privileged position, some
of which have been outlined above. At least some of these de-
fensive measures by national carriers can be countered by un-
compromised enforcement of the EC competition rules. The
goal of making airlines fit for competition can be best achieved
by exposing them to a competitive environment in Europe.
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